The concepts of manipulative abduction and of extending, disembodying, and distributing the mind can help delineate important aspects of the role of habits, rituals, and symbols in human cognition, including when new concepts are created. Taking advantage of some psychoanalytical and anthropological issues, I will show how symbolic habits in rituals can function as memory mediators which are able to play significant roles in human cognition and action. They can maximize abducibility and so recoverability of knowledge contents, including at the unconscious level.
Extending, Disembodying, and Distributing the Mind
The three cognitive movements I have indicated in the title of this section refer to the fact the human mind can delegate to external representations suitably stored in the environment important cognitive functions. The external representations can be merely mimetic (when they represent something already internally present in the mind, for example a triangle depicted in a blackboard), but also poietic, when external represented aspects are manipulated to the aim of discovering something new by exploiting the specific constraints of the materiality of the external "mediator" chosen. Also, all fields of scientific knowledge are characterized by these kind of processes, such as in the case of logic and mathematics.
In (Magnani 2009, chapter one) , when I introduced the concept of manipulative abduction,1 I explained that it takes advantage of the relationship between internal and external representations in what I have called an eco-cognitive perspective, exactly because in this case the role of the environment must be stressed. Cognitive action embedded in manipulative abduction generates information not yet available (for example in science the exploitation of external tools, devices, and instruments is widespread) to the aim of selecting or generating interesting hypotheses.2
To summarize this small section, not all cognitive processes are internal: extending, distributing, and disembodying the mind is a fundamental way of improving and rendering more powerful human cognitive performances.
Symbolic and Ritual Habits and Abduction

The Role of Artifacts
Manipulative abduction, which I have introduced in the first section, can be usefully exploited to shed new intellectual light on some passages related to certain of Jung's considerations illustrated in "On Psychic Energy". Usually cognitive scientists and epistemologists emphasize the role in science of external cognitive delegations to the environment -for example, the building of appropriate artifacts, usually called "models" -but the same process can be seen as active in the case of building through disembodiment of the mind cognitive habits, which are linked to various moral, emotional, attentional, affective, deontic, doxastic, etc. values, interacting with externalized ritual routines. Jung thinks that the "apperceiving consciousness" is constructed with the help of a "wide range of seeing and hearing" (Jung 1972b:228) .
Jung further says that the mystery of cultural development is the mobility and disposability of psychic energy, that is, a "life-process" in phenomena like "instincts, wishing, willing, affect, attention capacity to work", sexuality, morality, etc. The "psychic energy flow" is -obviously -also related to the various processes of progression and regression as adaptations to the environment and to the inner world, which regard the psychic health of human beings, often jeopardized by insufficient levels of what he calls "individuation". Psychic energy extends in the environment exactly as in the case of the primitive idea of mana, which can invade and modify everything in the environment, also giving birth to delegated and/or newly created meanings.
Habits as Memory Mediators
The anthropological example of psychic energy delegation given by Jung is the one of the Wachandi of Australia:
They dig a hole in the ground, oval in shape and set about with bushes so that it looks like a woman's genitals. Then they dance round this hole, holding their spears in front of them in imitation of an erect penis. As they dance round, they thrust their spears into the hole, shouting "Pulli nira, pulli nira, wataka!" (non fossa, non fossa, sed cunnus!). During the ceremony none of the participants is allowed to look at a woman (Jung 1972a:43) .
Here Jung clearly sees culture as a transformer of energy. The mimetic artifact, built on the ground, is an "analogue of the object of instinct", Jung says (Jung 1972a:42) . Psychic energy is applied to the external world (the ground) to transform it in an analogue of female genitals, that through the repeated ritual dance, miming the sexual act, suggests that the hole is de facto a vulva. It is clear that the artifact renders possible special cognitive processes also thanks to that ritual character which encourages interesting and fruitful inferential cognitive routines. Indeed, the psychic values, which -in psychoanalytic terms -relate to those inferential possibilities, can be "picked up" and so learnt by other members of the community still ignorant of those cognitive chances. The birth of agriculture is at stake, indeed Jung contends that "the mind then busies itself with the earth, and in turn is affected by it" and this fact favors the attention of human beings to create "the psychological prerequisite for cultivation. Agriculture did in fact arise, though not exclusively, from the formation of sexual analogies" (Jung 1972a:42) .
Restricted communities build artifacts that later, being available in the environment, can be sources of attention and learning. They play the role of memory mediators (or of "memory stores"),3 which reverberate the story of their origin and the actions related to them, in this case the possibility to invent (and later on to learn) cultivation.
We can easily guess that primitive minds are not a "natural home" for agriculture: a long period of time was necessary to arrive at the first collectives of farmers (Sterelny and Fraser 2016) . This explains the need, in order to invent agriculture, of the complicated artifactual process we have just described: a new habit and a new ritual -that is, a high-level cultural object -play a fundamental role. The related process is also an example of manipulative abduction because the new concept of cultivation is created only thanks to the building of that entire new social -and so artifactual -structure I have just illustrated. Let us repeat that the new ritual that relates to the corresponding habit, and which can be a source of knowledge for still uninformed individuals, incorporates information about the past because it represents that same story that is its origin. It is clear that we can say that the ritual artifact affords4 the individuals to grasp the ideas related to cultivation and so it favors what I have called maximization of abducibility (Magnani 2017) , which I will illustrate in the following section.
I have said above that we can easily guess that primitive minds are not a "natural home" for agriculture. This is an important point that must be further clarified, because it does not only concern "primitive" minds, but human cognition in general. If we say that in primitive minds some concepts do not emerge because the mind is not a natural home for them, this means that resorting to the processes of extending, distributing, and disembodying the mind is a fundamental, necessary, and unavoidable way for improving and rendering more powerful human cognitive performances. One could say that imagining the mind as extended, disembodied, and distributed, and consequently considering the related various interactions of the mind and the body with external mediators, is not so important because, after all, the internal part (a kind of "mastermind", so to speak) can or has to control the external parts.5 This is not true, as evidence from cognitive science and epistemology demonstrates that the interplay is critical in analyzing the relation between meaningful semiotic internal resources and devices and their dynamical interactions with the externalized semiotic "materiality" already stored in the environment.
Indeed, this materiality plays a specific and partially autonomous role in the internal/external interplay, because it exhibits (and operates through) its own cognitive constraints (for example constraints for allowable actions), and it is because of these material constraints that the internal mind, so to speak, can "learn" and unshackle its own rigidities and impossibilities: so to speak, the external constraints are imposed by the medium at hand. Of course, the constraints are delineated not only by the specific materiality at hand, they also depend on the specific cognitive delegation to the external device, prop, artifact, etc. which is at stake, performed by human beings. Therefore, a great part of the cognitive results (and novelties) that emerge in the internal mind thanks to the manipulations of the externalities exactly arrives from that external suitably modified external world.6
In a fascinating article, taking advantage of various amazing and very clear examples ranging from everyday to scientific cases, Hutchins deeply analyzes the role of the external constraints in human cognition through the association of conceptual and material structure in what he calls "conceptual blending", as a fundamental cognitive tactic (Hutchins 2005) . To further clarify the concept of "material constraint" with respect to the role of "actions", we can also say, following Zhang and Patel (2006:336, " The external and internal representation spaces can be described by either constraints or allowable actions. Constraints are the negations of allowable actions. That is, the allowable actions are those satisfying the constraints, and the constraints set the range of the allowable actions. If the external and internal representation spaces are described by constraints, then the affordances are the disjunction of the constraints of the two spaces. If the external and internal representation spaces are described by allowable actions, then the affordances are the conjunction of the allowable actions of the two spaces."
Symbols that Maximize Abducibility
Symbols as Memory Stores and Mediators
It is now necessary to add that it is only thanks to the role of cognitive delegations to external artifacts that human beings were able to unshackle the bonds and constraints which characterized the rigidity of the primitive minds. The idea of agriculture can emerge only with the help of artifactual external procedures that resort to the exploitation of rituals and to the construction of related habits. New ways of making knowledge and reasoning are invented, which surely do not have a "natural home" within a mind that instead does not take advantage of the possible cognitive resources which can be extracted from a suitably modified environment.
The transformation of the environment in something that possesses a cognitive value is also related -from a philosophical perspective -to a semiotic activity (that instead corresponds -in a psychoanalytic Jungian perspective -to the dissemination in the environment of the "psychic" energy -"libido", Freud 5 On the vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters and detractors, regarding the theories of extended mind and distributed cognition, cf. (Menary 2010] . 6 Just to provide a reference to other examples, an admirable analysis of the constraints intrinsic to the external materials (mainly diagrams) exploited by the ancient Greek mathematicians (especially geometricians) is given in (Netz 1999) . The book also illustrates the most important semiotic tools at work in ancient Greek mathematical reasoning. On this issue, see also (Magnani 2001). would have said), which can originate something new also from the semantic point of view: Jung calls this kind of novelty a symbol. In sum, the Wachandi example also refers to the fact that the invented ritual is a "symbol" because the new artifactual process establishes new meanings, new possibilities of making knowledge and reasoning, with respect to the members of the collectivity that can pay attention to the ritual itself with its objects, motor aspects (dance), and the various kinds of organic and non-organic physical structures that play significant roles. When interested humans will be able to internalize the new meanings, their neural networks will be appropriately conditioned in such a way that Jung can say they will present an intrinsic "disposable energy" and we will not need further exposition to the external ritual to act as they act.
It is in this perspective that it is also very natural to see magical artifactual externalizations -in alchemy, for example, with its attention to the flux of energy -as the fathers of modern science. Indeed, Jung himself contends that men are playfully interested in the objects and this can grant the chance of various kinds of discoveries.
When the new "symbol" is originated, Jung says, the Wachandi's hole in the ground "is not a sign for the genitals of a woman, but a symbol that stands for the idea of the earth woman who is to be made fruitful" (Jung 1972a:42) . It is obvious that a lot of anthropological studies can provide examples of artifacts and remains that are related to more or less important artifactual rituals such as the one I have illustrated, even if we know perfectly well that it is not always easy to explain their meanings.
Abducibility Maximization through Symbolic Habits
When we build an external artifact similar to the one I have just illustrated we can also say we are transforming a natural niche in a "cognitive niche" (Laland et al.2000) 7 thanks to the psychic activity of both human consciousness and unconscious.
Symbols in Jungian sense characterize that certain kind of cognitive niche which favors the maximization of abducibility regarding their past structure and meaning that constituted them. Of course, they are absolutely stable and reliable -because they are externally represented and fixed -so they can overcome the puzzling status of evanescent subjective thoughts and representations. They can relatively easily promote abductions in the minds of individuals that pay attention to them, as I have explained above, favoring the knowledge of the acts of cultivation.
Jung also stressed that -analogously to the case of the Whachandi -symbols are important in that case of diagnostic reasoning that is at play in the psychoanalytic treatment. The analysand's abductive cognition is enhanced thanks to artifacts (drawings, sketches, icons, etc.) made by the analysand herself during the treatment, as tools that are not merely a product of consciousness but also of the unconscious. Furthermore, these symbols share various aspects with the ones produced during the history of humanity as archetypes still present in the so-called collective unconscious, Jung obviously adds: they favor that abductive cognition of the analysand which has to detect aspects hidden to her consciousness.
Manipulative abduction is still at play: the symbols appropriately built during the psychoanalytic treatment are progressively manipulated and transformed -also taking advantage of their dominant iconic character -so that, intertwined with speech, affective issues and other cognitive aspects of the psychoanalytic setting (also composed by the analyst) can trigger fruitful abductions by the analysand regarding her own psychic problems and spur the need for individualization as renovated mental growth and health. Jung calls mandala [Jung 1968b ] the symbolic artifacts constructed by the analysands -in this case not related to ritual aspects regarding nature, sex, and cultivation, but to the problem of detecting earlier stages of their psychic life. The individuals have to be helped to attribute meaning to some parts of 7 (Laland and Sterelny 2006) defend in detail the niche-construction perspective within evolutionary biology, rejecting, also on the basis of empirical data, various objections against it. More recent comments on cognitive niches, with respect to the role of environmental resources and the so-called "extended mind" are given in (Sterelny 2010) . (Bertolotti and Magnani 2017) further illustrate the current debate regarding the relationships between cognitive and ecological niche theories, also describing the notions of "enablement" and of "affordance". their psychic life which have been previously -so to speak -neglected, causing problems. Hence, those artifacts reverberate subliminal fundamental contents.
It is important to note that the external materiality chosen to represent internal contents is not neutral. To make an example, drawing colored instead of black-and-white images can better favor abducibility but also vice versa, depending on the context, so that the external "mediator" plays an independent role, as it happens in scientific research, for example in the natural sciences, where the chosen models are more or less appropriate to promote fruitful new interesting hypotheses.8 Jung correctly thinks that people can make complex drawings and paintings without having any knowledge of their meaning. That is because the interaction with the environment is also due to the role played by unconscious dimensions. Those paintings seem to play the role of kinds of "magical" contents which reverberate the collective unconscious, because they are icons, whose possible utility is not consciously experienced by the analysand.
Also in this case we can easily see the difference between mere internal cognition and the extension (or disembodiment) of the mind (I have already explained at the end of subsection 3.2) in the case of an ordinary interaction with the external world. It is important to note that we are not simply facing an inferential process that is merely directed from the internal mental cognitive resources, for example thanks to analogical thinking or model-based reasoning, but with a hybrid activity of cognition in which the role of externalities is crucial and partially autonomous with respect to the internal mind. In the case of Jungian speculations, it is also extremely interesting to see that the practices which refer to the external devices and props incorporate more than the individual involved in it can or does know and that belong to her unconscious parts. Surely this aspect might suggest some kinds of acknowledgment of habits that never become conscious and that belong to a kind of tacit knowledge, such as Polanyi would have said (Polanyi 1966) . I have already said above that symbols are "memory mediators" because they make an optimal stimulation of abducibility of their own embedded past (which refer to the patients that built them): that is, they present to the people the chance of abducing those hypotheses regarding their mental events that were at their origin. Symbols can constitute the best possible representation of what is not yet "comprehended" by consciousness but at the roots of current disturbs and discomfort.
What I call maximization of abducibility is obviously related to the fact that this kind of reasoning is extremely "eco-cognitive-sensitive". To better explain this effect of maximization it is necessary to illustrate the general aspects that influence the abductive force of human beings. First is, importantly, the so-called 1) optimization of situatedness that directly concerns our example: to favor the solution of the abductive problem at stake, the forms of exosomatization (or externalization of human bodily activities) of our Wachandi example make available a setting that presents data which are "optimally positioned" to favor the cognitive abductive processes of both the people that invent the ritual and of the ones that later on are attending it. Also other aspects that characterize the maximization of abducibility have to be quoted, even if not present in our present case: 2) maximization of changeability of the various data of the eco-cognitive situation, to enrich the information and knowledge available, and so the openness to the variability of them; 3) the importance of the attention to this continuous flux of information: in particular to the constant flux of new information available but also the new information that is cyclically inferentially generated during the various stages of the abductive process itself; 4) multimodality: the inferential abductive processes are strongly multimodal and are favored by the availability of various kinds of cognitive devices (not only propositions, but also diagrams, visualizations, simulations, artifacts, etc.).
A reviewer of this article very useful noted that also in the case of "framing" effects, for instance, individuals react to something they do not deliberately consider and that in this light we can interpret framing in terms of "symbols that maximize abducibility". Let us expand this issue in the light of Jung's suggestions. I think in these cases of absence of conscious deliberation Jung's analysis can be of help because it satisfactorily shows how many human practices incorporate more than the individual involved in it can or does know. This happens because, given the capacity of appropriate artifacts to also reflect unconscious aspects, for example in the case of the Mandala in psychoanalytic settings, the individuals that have built it tacitly had exported important aspects of their unconscious (later on to be detected and interpreted by the analyst to the aim of the therapy).
Conversely we can hypothesize that suitable artifacts can be built and exploited, for example by some collective agencies, to also promote unconscious reactions in the individuals that are invested by them, to the aim of efficiently producing tacit habits that will never become conscious (but that are instead clearly fixed at the unconscious level) capable of tacitly acting in various pragmatic situations. It is in this perspective that we can interpret the framing effects I quoted above, when individuals respond to something they do not consciously consider, because that "something" works as a "symbol that maximize abducibility". If framing is composed by a set of concepts and cognitive perspectives on how individuals, groups, and collectives build their lives and perceive and communicate about various aspects of reality, this is because they are influenced by various agencies, such as for example mass media or political and social movements and organizations that exploit a multimodal variety of "symbols", in a Jungian sense, able to maximize abducibility, so as those individuals, groups, and collectives are submitted to frames that compel them to abduce, in front of certain data, following the desired modalities.
We also have to add that there are, of course, other artifacts that play different roles in human and animal cognition and biological life (such as caches of food, landmarks, spider webs, beehives, etc.) which are related to both instinctual and plastic endowments. We have to note that the "symbolic" rituals in the Jungian sense play a plastic cognitive artifactual role which is basically "cultural". They rebuild cognitive niches to the aim of favoring new cognitive results and functions, related to the possibility of important consequent (new) actions. Moreover, other examples of external artifactual mediators I studied in the past and that I have to cite here are the ones related to scientific reasoning: they play the role of "epistemic mediators" I have introduced in chapters one and three of (Magnani 2009) , which can promote scientific creativity or simply help scientist to go ahead in what Kuhn calls "normal science". I have also introduced the concept of "moral mediator" in (Magnani 2007) to the aim of describing their role in situations in which moral behavior is at play, often facing with the need of creating new moral frameworks. Of course, many external artifactual mediators invented by human beings are not necessarily related to creative cognition: they are merely "anchors" that can be picked up just to maximize the abducibility of already collectively known hypotheses, simply not immediately or completely present in some individuals. It is the case of many religious artifactual tools, which encourage faith and spirituality basically as memory mediators of religious contents.
Ignorance, Habits, and Manipulative Abduction
In the everyday behavior of human beings following habits, it is certainly also useful to avoid situations of indecision, and to overcome what the philosophical tradition has indicated through the words of Peirce "the irritation of doubt". At the same time following habits surely refers to that kind of attainment of a belief, also called "fixation of belief", still strongly emphasized by Peirce.
Human doubt is certainly related to a state of ignorance: we can say that building habits is normally related to ignorance and at the same time to the problem of overcoming the ignorance itself. Let us quickly illustrate the central aspects of this link between habits and ignorance, a kind of connection that is even more understandable taking advantage of the concept of abduction.
I have already said above that artifacts related to habits can play a different role if related to human and animal cognition, or biological life, because they are related to both instinctual and plastic endowments. It is obvious to say that a behavior we can anthropomorphically call "ritual", for example a spider weaving and manipulating its web, is related to instinctual aspects. A different case is the one of humans (but also animals) when they are dealing with artifactual rituals (and related habits) that are due to plastic activities of learning, that is to activities that we are used to call -more appropriately in the case of humans -"cultural". In the case of habits that are linked to deep plastic (and so "cultural") endowments of human beings, such as the one regarding the Wachandi I have illustrated above, they are surely fruit of a new abductive creative cognition and so to an activity of "guessing". It is important to stress that these kinds of novel instituted habits also have the important outcome of inventing and establishing both a new "knowledge" and new possible consequent actions (in the Wachandi's case a new knowledge and a new practice pertaining cultivation): they are clear cases of ignorance-based habits.
On the contrary, when humans adopt very well-known and established habits, already available and acquired as common rules of action, it is of course more appropriate to speak of knowledge-based habits (Magnani et al. 2016) . They immediately "afford" possibilities to human beings in various ways. To make a trivial but clear example, a standard chair affords human beings to sit down because of the habit of sitting down: coherently, we humans have adopted this habit of sitting down on a special artifact (also in the case of certain religious rituals, for example) and indeed we do not have the habit of sleeping on standard chairs (but we also know that in this respect cats have different habits...)
We can conclude that, in the case of the construction of artifacts that are intertwined with rituals and related habits, the state of ignorance leads to the need for triggering abductive cognition. As I have illustrated in the previous sections, we are dealing with a case of "manipulative abduction", that is, to a kind of abductive cognition that is strongly due to the extensive and not marginal role played by a suitably transformed environment. The final result consists in an increased knowledge -we are faced with a kind of ampliative abductive cognition: new pieces of knowledge are made available that can be exploited immediately and possibly picked up and used by human beings who belong to the appropriate collectives. Indeed, the nature of rituals is that of becoming stable -and consequently unambiguously available and sharable -cultural references.
In sum, artifacts exploited in newly built symbolic rituals, when in turn linked to new established habits, allow human agents to augment knowledge and possibilities of subsequent actions. The manipulative abduction that permits this kind of complicated and rich cognitive process generates a permanent modification of the environment and of the cognitive endowments of the interested human beings, along with new information, knowledge, and "know how" that can be exploited in frameworks characterized by reliable regularities and high levels of predictivity.
Conclusion
In this article I have stressed that the perspective related to disembodying, extending, and distributing the mind is fundamental to understand, from a philosophical and a cognitive point of view, the role of external artifacts as both ritual tools and habit-makers. I have taken advantage of an interplay between cognitive and Jungian psychoanalytic considerations related to the dissemination in the environment of what Jung calls "psychic energy". We have seen that symbols, in the Jungian sense, are artifacts/tools which originate habits that play the role of memory mediators and at the same time of maximizers of abducibility, because they render possible cognitive processes not viable without them.
